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This paper examines the relationship between risk, 
concentration and the exercise of market power by banking 
institutions. We use monthly balance-sheet and interest rate 
data for the Colombian banking system from 1997 to 2006. 
The evidence shows that, in the face of high risk, banks 
transfer a larger share of risk to customers through higher 
intermediation margins. The result suggests that systemic risk 
acts as a “collusion” device for banks: while high concentration 
is not enough to have collusion, the true effects of high market 
concentration on interest rates’ mark-ups emerge when the 
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Riesgo, concentración y poder de mercado en el sistema financiero. 












Este trabajo explora la relación entre riesgo, concentración y el el 
ejercicio de poder de mercado en el sector financiero. Se utiliza 
información mensual de balances financieros de instituciones 
bancarias colombianas en el periodo 1997 a 2006. La evidencia 
muestra que en periodos de alto riesgo los bancos tienden a 
transferir a sus clientes una proporción mayor del riesgo a través 
de los márgenes de intermediación. Esto sugiere qe el riesgo 
sistémico actúa como un mecanismo colusivo para los bancos. Una 
alta concentración de mercado no es suficiente para que haya 
colusión:  es en situaciones de alto riesgo sistémco que la 
concentración se traduce en ejercicio de poder de mercado. 
  
Palabras clave : Bancos, poder de mercado, riesgo, concentración, márgenes de 
intermediación. 
  





This paper examines the effect of increases in risk on the relationship between 
concentration and the exercise of market power by banking institutions. Our data covers the 
Colombian financial market for the period 1997-2006. In the late 1990s Colombia 
experienced a big macroeconomic crisis that caused large increases in the risk faced by 
banks, followed by a recovery during 2002-2006. In addition, the Colombian financial 
sector has seen an almost continuous increase in concentration since 1996, coupled with the 
existence of financial conglomerates that control a considerable number of banks. 
 
We relate a market power proxy, the Lerner index, with measures of concentration and risk. 
Our results suggest that the correlation is positive with concentration and negative with 
risk. Our ultimate goal is to understand how risk and concentration influence the exercise of 
market power in the banking industry. We find that an increase in concentration allows for 
a stronger transmission of risk to the Lerner index (i.e to the customers): when risk is high 
firms transfer a larger share of risk to customers through higher risk premiums.  This result 
suggests that systemic risk acts as a “collusion” device for banks. Thus, while high 
concentration is not enough to have collusion, the true effects of high market concentration 
on interest rates’ mark-ups emerge when the system is under stress.  
 
The paper is divided in seven sections the first being this introduction. After a brief review 
of the evolution of the Colombian banking system, we discuss the relevant literature in 
section three. The model is presented in section four, while an overview of data is given in  
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section five. Finally section six discusses and analyses the results ending with the 
conclusions in section seven.  
II. Background 
The Colombian banking system changed from a strongly state-owned sector in the mid-
1970s to a very open industry in the early 2000s. A major reform in the industry took place 
in the 1970s, when a type of bank was created with the specific aim of serving the housing 
market. Besides having a monopoly on this market, these institutions, called corporaciones 
de ahorro y vivienda (CAVs), enjoyed regulated interest rates designed to protect them 
against inflation spikes.
 1,2  
 
The 1980s brought the Latin American crisis and with it the bankruptcy of several banks 
and financial institutions across the region, including Colombia. The Colombian 
government was forced to take control of a number of institutions which would be 
privatized later in the 1980s and 1990s. However, except for the creation of an insurance 
deposit, no further reforms took place at the time.  In the early 1990s a new reform allowed 
foreign investors to own 100% of a Colombian bank. Its aim was to promote a universal 
banking system and to encourage competition. 
 
An asset price and loan bubble in the second half of the 1990s lead to a second major crisis 
in the banking industry. Colombian GDP fell in 1999 for the first time since the great 
depression (a fall of 4.2%), while the unemployment rate rose to a peak of 20.5% in the 
                                                 
1 A complete historical review of the evolution of the banking sector in Colombia during the 20
th century is 
available in Caballero and Urrutia (2006). 
2 The literal translation of CAV would be housing and savings corporation.  
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third quarter of 2000. The associated risk to the banking system is reflected by the large 
decrease in the quality of loans depicted in Figure 1. As in the 1980s, the government had 
to step in, assisting both private and publicly owned financial institutions. In part as a 
consequence of the crisis, the regulation of the financial market changed to include new 
types of institutions and to allow banks to issue mortgage loans.
3 The reforms continued to 
promote a more competitive and universally oriented banking system, and today most 
institutions are commercial and mortgage banks at the same time.
4 
  
Our data spans over the period 1997-2006, when the banking system has witnessed an 
unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions. In December of 1997 there were 34 banks 
and 7 CAVs, in December 2006 only 17 multipurpose banks. Consequently, concentration 
of the loan portfolio, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), has steadily 
increased over the period 1996 - 2006. The evolution of the HHI is depicted in Figure 2. 
However, much of the story of the Colombian banking system has to do with how financial 
conglomerates have evolved over the past decade. For example, by December of 2006, the 
Sarmiento/AVAL group controlled 27.8% of the consumption and 31.9% of the commercial 
loans portfolio through 4 of the 17 multipurpose banks in the system. As a consequence, 
Figure 3, which graphs the HHI grouping banks by financial conglomerates, shows a higher 
concentration index.
5  
                                                 
3 The other institutions in the financial market are the financial cooperatives, which focus on investment 
banking, and commercial financial companies –essentially leasing and niche specialized institutions. This 
work focuses on banks and CAVs. 
4 Commercial banks are referred to those whose main activity is receiving and allocating resources. Mortgage 
banks refers to those specialized in the housing market. These are essentially what we refer in the text to 
banks and CAVs respectively. 
5 There are other relevant institutions in the financial market, namely financial cooperatives and commercial 
financial companies. The latter are essentially leasing and niche specialized institutions, while the former are  
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III. Literature Review 
3.1 Recent performance of the Colombian banking system 
Whether the regulatory reforms in Colombian banking sector succeeded is a matter of 
debate. Their stated aim was to promote more competition. Clavijo (2000) and Carrasquilla 
et al. (1997) for instance argue that they have failed: savings remain low and investments 
are still financed based on their collateral –not on expected return and risk.  
 
In contrast, a review of several studies in Janna (2004) points out that while economies of 
scale in Colombia are exploited on a range that goes from 24% to 39%, depending on the 
type of account considered, bank investments are much more efficient: 82%. Table 1 
summarizes the main results in Janna’s work. 
 
Janna (2003) and Estrada et al. (2003) have analogous results. When they compare bank 
costs using the most efficient bank in the market as a benchmark, their results suggest that 
costs could be reduced somewhere between 27% and 51%. When using absolute efficiency 
instead of relative efficiency, costs could be reduced somewhere between 57% and 72%. In 
fact, according to Janna (2003) the typical most inefficient bank for the period 1992 – 2002 
would be a private domestic bank with a 78% potential for reducing its costs, while the 
most efficient one would be a foreign owned bank with a 54% potential for cost reduction. 
A summary of results is presented in Table 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
more related with investment banking. We focus on CAVs and banks, which by December 2006, held 95.7% 




According to Janna (2004), the source of improvements in efficiency is different if the 
country is in a crisis. In normal years (prior to 1998), general market conditions explain the 
improvements; when the country was immersed in a major economic crisis, the variables 
determining efficiency were directly under the control of each bank. During the crisis, 
Janna argues, banks were forced to improve costs or suffer the consequences of 
inefficiency. This forced them to individually improve based on their control variables.  
 
Estrada (2005) reports similar results, but he also finds a significant loss in efficiency in the 
period 2003-2004. He does not however offer an explanation. Table 3 shows that 
regulation, concentration, the economic cycle, the number of branches, the quality of the 
product and public ownership decrease efficiency. Size, solvency and the importance of the 
commercial portfolio increase it. 
 
In another related study, Estrada (2005) reviews the impact of mergers on competition and 
efficiency. He finds no strong evidence of collusion on the deposits side but says nothing 
about the lending side. 
   
Brock et al. (2000)  examine the bank intermediation margin for seven Latin American 
countries, including Colombia, in the 1990s –when their financial systems were 
deregulated. They find that Colombia’s margins are the highest and explained mostly by 
macroeconomic variables. They also find evidence that higher operational costs imply 
higher margins and that there is a positive correlation between high margins and non-




Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999a) show that intermediation margin levels in Colombia 
remained relatively stable over time but its composition changed over the past three 
decades. They decompose the margin into four parts: operative costs, financial taxes, 
market power and portfolio quality. They find little competition in the Colombian banking 
system during the 1970s and 1980s, with an average mark-up of 29%. The 1990s show an 
improvement, when private banks had market power. They also find a positive correlation 
between portfolio quality and lower margins, particularly in the 1990s. Despite the smaller 
than expected effects in competition, privatizations and foreign investment seem to have 
brought efficiency improvements. 
 
Barajas, Steiner y Salazar (1999b) additionally find that the entry of foreign-owned banks 
reduced the intermediation margins and financial costs, and improved the portfolio quality. 
However, they note that despite better productivity and portfolio indicators, these foreign-
owned banks chose to operate at the incumbents’ margins and to avoid competition when 
possible. Nevertheless, they argue that the 1990s liberalization process reduced market 
power in the banking industry.  
 
Finally, Castro and Steiner (2002) report an increase in competition during the 1990s. The 
intermediation margin fell during this decade, though the observed level remained higher 
than that observed in developed economies. For these authors, the margin depends on non 
financial costs, reserve requirements, risk and market structure. They also find a positive 




3.2 Strategy for analysis 
Two strands in the literature are relevant for our purposes. One connects economies of scale 
with size, risk and costs, and with the advantages of universal banking. The other focuses 
on the link between concentration and market power; it relates market structure with prices 
and the degree of competition in the system. The latter is closely related to our approach in 
this paper.  
 
De Nicoló (2000) gives a detailed review of the literature on economies of scale in the 
banking sector. He examines empirically the relationship between size and operational 
diversification of banks, their risk levels and their market value. Controlling for regulation 
and market structure, he finds that in developed financial systems risk and bank size are 
positively correlated, while risk and market value are negatively correlated.  
 
De Nicolo, whose sample includes banks from Japan, USA and Europe, is very careful in 
noting that the results may depend strongly on how developed the financial system is. Thus, 
they may not be applicable to the Colombian case.  Another interesting aspect of De Nicolo 
(2000) is the measure of risk he uses. Textbooks discuss at least three type of risk inherent 
to banks: market risks, loan risks and liquidity risk. Freixas and Rochet (1998) add out-of-
balance-sheet risks and operational risks. Instead of a direct measure of one or several of 
these types of risk, De Nicolo uses the z index –a measure of global insolvency based on 
the assumption that bank profits are distributed normally
6. 
 
                                                 
6 The global insolvency risk is the probability that losses exceed profits. The z index is the number of standard 
deviations that a particular realization of banks profits should fall in order for the assets to be exhausted.  
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The second relevant strand of literature focuses on the relationship between concentration 
and market power. This paper applies methodologies used in Bikker and Haaf (2202) and 
Prager and Hannan (1998). Bikker and Haaf (2002) use the H-statistic, proposed by Panzar 
and Rosse (1987), to examine the competitiveness of the banking sector in a variety of 
countries, mostly European. Based on how the firms’ revenue changes when factor prices 
change, this model assesses whether the firms behave like a cartel, monopolistic 
competitors or competitively. Its main limitation is that it does not account for strategic 
interaction among firms or barriers to entry. Moreover, the tests for monopolistic 
competition and perfect competition are valid only in long-run equilibrium.  
 
First, using balance-sheet data, Bikker and Haaf examine the exercise of market power by 
banks, controlling for size and country. With all banks in the sample, they reject the market 
power hypothesis. This result stands in sub samples by country and size. 
 
Next, they examine the econometric relationship between the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) 
index and the H-Statistic. Their results suggest that the number of banks is negatively 
correlated with the degree of competition. Further analysis suggests that in markets with a 
few large banks, the small banks have little effect on the degree of competition. The authors 
conclude that there is a relation between market structure and competition driven by the 
presence of large banks.  
  
Nathan and Neave (1989) look at a different aspect of market power. They argue that 
concentration may generate conditions for market power, but it does not necessarily imply 
the exercise of such power. Specifically, they study the possibility that market power is not  
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exercised when entry is relatively easy and sunk costs are not significant. Using a dataset of 
Canadian banks for the period 1982-1984, they use the H-statistic as a measure of 
competition, controlling for wages, input costs and interest payments. The paper rejects the 
hypotheses of monopolistic or oligopolistic behavior in every market considered. Contrary 
to Bikker and Haaf (2002), they do not find that bank size matters. 
 
Prager and Hannan (1998) examine the effects of mergers over market prices and find 
evidence of the exercise of market power in the U.S. financial system for the period 1991-
1994.
7 To identify the effect of prices, they consider markets where horizontal mergers took 
place and use markets without mergers as control groups. They take deposit interest rates to 
be the relevant prices, define the markets geographically and take into account product 
differentiation.
8 Their findings suggest exercise of market power, as deposit rates offered 
by participants in horizontal mergers declined by a greater percentage than did deposit rates 
offered by banks not operating in markets in which such mergers took place. Moreover, in 
markets where mergers occurred, they find that merged and non-merged banks behave in a 
similar way. They interpret this as evidence against the argument that quality improvements 
of merged banks are responsible for the observed price changes. 
 
Summarizing, the evidence suggests that there is possibly a link between market structure 
and market power –albeit higher concentration does not always imply the exercise of such 
                                                 
7 They use data from the Federal Reserve's Monthly Survey of Selected Deposits. Data covers between 500 
and 550 banks for a period of 25 months.  
8 Product differentiation is accounted for by using three different types of deposit products, NOW accounts, 
personal money market deposit accounts and small three month certificates of deposit. NOW accounts are 
defined as interest-bearing accounts that allow unlimited checking. Money market account are interest bearing 
accounts that restrict the account holder to six withdrawals per month by automatic transfers or checks, only 
three of which may be checks.  
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power–; and, in developed financial systems, a further link between market structure and 
the efficiency in dealing with risk. Specifically for Colombia, there seems to be a link 
between higher efficiency, foreign-owned banks and mergers. However, whether this 
higher efficiency translated into more competition is controversial. There is also some 
evidence that the determinants of bank efficiency may be different when the system is in 
crisis. 
IV. The Model  
Our objective is twofold. First we want to establish comparable market power indicators for 
the period 1996 – 2006. Second, we want to calculate the effects that changes in 
concentration had (if any) over the exercise of market power, taking into account the effect 
of risk in this relationship.  
 
We assume, as in Prager and Hannan (1998) that the relevant prices for the financial sector 
are the interest rates. We use this approach to construct a Lerner Index, which we use to 
link econometrically market power with concentration, as measured by the HHI. 
 
4.1Concentration and Market Power Measurement 
The measure for concentration we use is the HHI. Some banks are controlled by the same 
conglomerate. Thus in order to examine the difference between a market where all banks 
act independently and one where they have cooperation incentives, we construct the HHI 
by bank and by financial conglomerate. For the latter, we aggregate the data of the banks 




To link concentration with market power, we carry out an exercise in the spirit of the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm discussed in detail in Salinger (1989). Following 
Prager and Hannan (1998) we use the lending and deposit interest rates as prices, taking the 
latter as the equivalent of marginal costs.
9  
 
Our measure of market power is the Lerner index. In principle, this measure should account 







i i − −γ
with a risk 
premium 
*
jk k k i f γ = . However, it is difficult to calculate the risk premium directly. Instead, 
we account for it separately in the regression, using a proxy on the right-hand side: the ratio 















j i  refers to the lending interest rate for type j credit in bank k and 
c i  is the weighted 
average by amount of the fixed term deposit interest rates.  
4.2 Estimation 
Once we have the Lerner index, we estimate the following equation: 
 
                                                 
9 The indicator would be a perfect measure of market power if in fact the bank’s only business lending is 
deposits. In reality it is not (though it is an important component) and so we take that into account when 
constructing the right hand variables.   
10 Strictly speaking, in the construction of the Lerner index we ignore the fact that banks products typically are 
differentiated. Data on products by banks are unavailable at the time in Colombia. We thus, work under the 
implicit assumption that banks do offer different products, but they decide jointly about them.  
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(1)     Fe Others e c HHI b a L + + + + = * ln * ln * ln γ  
 
where lnL is the natural logarithm of the Lerner index, lnHHI is the natural logarithm for 
the concentration index and  γ ln  is the natural logarithm for the risk measure. Others are 
control variables: the natural logarithm for an industrial production index, quarterly 
dummies intended to capture economic activity and a monthly trend intended to measure 
technological changes. Fe represents fixed effects by bank or conglomerate depending on 
the aggregation we are considering.  
 
k γ  is a measure of ex post risk. Contrary to an ideal ex ante risk measure, it captures only 
risk issues related to the chances of default. Suppose that the coefficient  k γ  reflects 
exclusively the relationship between non-performing loans and the risk premium of each 
financial institution. In that case, one would expect that in equation (1) c=1 as long as 
markets value correctly ex ante risk and banks are risk neutral. Similarly, c values greater 
than one would be indicative of risk aversion among banks. In such a case, one should ask 
why these banks remain in the market: in a competitive market, such risk aversion implies 
higher marginal costs; such banks should not be able to survive competition. 
 
However, in our case the estimate of c also reflects that  k γ is an imperfect measure of risk. 
If  k γ  systematically overestimates (underestimates) risk, the value of the coefficient will be 
biased towards zero (away from zero). Also, if  k γ  is simply a noisy proxy for risk, the 
estimate of c will have attenuation bias. Hence, if in fact c contains information about 




Since we cannot use the coefficient on  k γ  to identify the exercise of market power, we 
focus on a subtler form of it. We expect that the ability of a bank to exercise its market 
power differ depending on the level of risk that the system faces. Our measure of potential 
market power is the market’s concentration, but even in the face of high concentration 
banks may be unable to sustain high mark-ups. However, it may be that systemic crises act 
as a coordination (or collusion) device: banks may compete less aggressively when in 
danger. Thus, one would find that an increase in systemic risk implies a higher rise in the 
Lerner index when the market is concentrated: the increase in rates would include both a 
higher risk premium and higher, collusive prices. In other words, in more concentrated 
markets banks would transfer to their customers a higher share of the risk. To capture this 
effect, we include an interaction between risk and HHI on the right-hand side of the 
regression: 
 
(2)     () fe Others e HHI d c HHI b a L + + + + + = * ln * ln * ln * ln * ln γ γ  
 
A positive coefficient on the interaction term is then indicative of an increase in the 
exercise of market power when systemic risk is high. 
V. Data 
The estimations in this paper use monthly data starting May 1997 until December 2006. 
This information was provided by the Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia 




Concentration and quality of portfolio were built based on the monthly balance sheet and 
income and expenses information reported by the banks to the Superfinanciera. This data 
includes information for the entire banking system, i.e. banks, saving corporations, 
financial corporations and commercial financial companies.  
 
Our analysis focuses on commercial and consumption loans, and only those administered 
by banks and CAVs.
11 There are other relevant institutions in the financial market, namely 
financial cooperatives –essentially leasing and niche specialized institutions– and 
commercial financial companies –devoted mainly to investment banking. We exclude them 
because their interest rate data is not available for the whole sample, but in any case their 
share of the market is small when compared with banks and CAVS. For example, banks 
held 95.7% of the commercial loans portfolio and 92% of the consumption loans portfolio 
in December 2006.  
 
Superfinanciera also provided us with lending and deposit interest rates by bank and type 
of credit. The amount that each bank lent or received at any given interest rate on a 
particular month is also available, so we are able to calculate a weighted average of the 
rates when necessary. Our deposit interest rate is then a weighted average of fixed term 
certificates of deposit. The reported interest rate by financial conglomerate is a weighted 
average of the interest rates of the banks in the conglomerate. 
 
                                                 
11 We follow the classification by type of portfolio that appears in the balance sheet: commercial, 
consumption and mortgage. By regulation, banks report microcredits separately starting 2002.  
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We include the industrial production index as a proxy of the level of economic activity. It is 
constructed every month from a sample of manufacturing companies in Colombia by the 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), the national statistics 
department.  
 
Finally, the history of mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies was built using data from 
Superfinanciera, the banks’ websites and the magazine Dinero. 
5.1 Interest Rate Evolution 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of both deposit and lending interest rates. Colombia has 
passed from a period of very high interest rates to lower, less volatile rates since 2001. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the evolution of the consumption and commercial interest rates 
for the three main financial conglomerates and the public banks. The level and evolution 
are, of course, similar to those shown in Figure 4. Overall, dispersion does not seem 
particularly large, with the exception of specific periods. The higher rates charged and paid 
by public banks during the crisis are not necessarily explained by particularities in their 
pricing behavior. An alternative explanation rests in selection: the government intervenes 
banks on a non-random basis. For example, a bank with liquidity problems is more likely to 
be intervened and also to charge and pay higher interest rates.  
VI. Results and Analysis 
We report our results first by bank and then by financial group. Figure 7 shows the share of 
each type of credit in total loans. Two things stand out: commercial loans are the most 
important type of credit in the Colombian banking system; and the effect of the late 1990s  
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recession shows strongly in mortgage loans –as one might expect from the change in their 
regulation and the rapid increase in their risk.  
 
The evolution of the Lerner index calculated using real interest rates is presented in Figure 
8. Its level increased until 2003 and fell afterwards. Values above one in 2003 are due to 
negative real deposit rates in some months. For the aggregate system, this only happens in 
April 2003.  
 
It is important to calculate a real Lerner index –the Lerner index based on real rather than 
nominal rates. Colombia experienced a substantial reduction of the inflation rate throughout 
the sample. The correlation of this reduction with market power can be seen by comparing 
Figure 8with Figure 9 where nominal instead of real interest rates were used. Market power 
increases when inflation is low through a reduction in the real deposit rate, which is the 
denominator in the Lerner index. Since the intermediation margin is a difference in rates, 
the increase is apparent only if market power is measured with the real Lerner index. 
 
The results of the estimations following equation (1) and equation (2) by institution are 
reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) omit the interaction term between concentration 
and risk; all other columns include it. Beyond the main variables of our model, all 
regressions include bank fixed effects, a trend, the logarithm of the industrial production 
index (IPI) and quarterly dummies that control for fluctuations in economic activity. The 
analysis in columns (1) and (2) is based on variable constructed using total assets. In (3) 
and (4) it is based on total loans excluding mortgages; in (5) on consumption loans; and in 




The results without the interaction term are counterintuitive. Risk has no statistically 
significant effect on mark-ups. This result is surprising: since our Lerner index is not risk 
adjusted, risk premiums should increase it, even if banks are competitive, unless (i) either 
the loan demand elasticity or the savings offer elasticity were very large, or (ii) banks ration 
credit when systemic risk is high, so that only very safe loans are assigned for which the 
risk premiums are actually lower. The first explanation would imply that risk is always 
irrelevant for our Lerner index. The second would imply that risk may have a positive or a 
negative effect on the Lerner index, depending on the extent of credit rationing.  
 
When the interaction term is included, the results regarding risk vanish; risk becomes 
relevant with a negative sign. This result suggests extensive credit rationing. But something 
else happens as well: the increases in concentration imply now increases in market power, 
regardless of the way risk is measured. This is in line with the theoretical predictions. 
While the coefficients of both concentration and the interaction term are positive in the last 
four columns, the coefficient of the interaction is statistically significant only in the 
aggregate market and in the consumption market. What about the market for commercial 
loans? Its results are perhaps not altogether surprising: companies have better access to 
external credit than consumers. 
 
 
Next we repeat the exercise, but this time we aggregate the balance-sheet data by financial 
conglomerates –that is, we treat all banks in a conglomerate as a single institution able to 
make joint or closely coordinated decisions. The evolution of the corresponding Lerner  
 
20
index, shown in Figure 10, is similar to that in Figure 8. The trend is similar, although the 
levels of mark-ups of the financial conglomerates are slightly higher than those of the 
aggregate market. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the model estimations by financial conglomerates. The table is 
organized in the same way as Table 4. This time, however, we include fixed effects only for 
conglomerates; banks that do not belong to a conglomerate have no associated dummy. 
Even without taking into account the interaction between risk and concentration, the effect 
of the latter on market power is non-negative. If the interaction is included, the coefficient 
on the concentration measure is always positive and statistically significant. The coefficient 
on risk stills suggests strong credit rationing when risk is higher. Finally, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is always positive and significant regardless of the market. 
 
To summarize, we identify three effects. First, there is a direct positive effect of 
concentration on the Lerner index as shown by the HHI coefficient. This may be a sign that 
higher concentration leads to the exercise of market power, or that mergers occur when for 
external reasons risk premiums are high. However, we are explicitly controlling for risk in 
the regression, so either those mergers are undertaken to achieve medium-term cost 
reductions (i.e. their benefits are to come later), or they are undertaken to be able to raise 
mark-ups quickly (that is, their benefit comes from the extra market power), or both. The 
second effect is that the Lerner index falls when risk increases, which is consistent with 
strong credit rationing in the market. Finally, an increase in concentration allows for a 
stronger transmission of risk to the Lerner index. This last result suggests that our 




The results do change depending on whether one considers banks individually or 
aggregated by conglomerate. For total loans (columns 3 and 4 in both tables), all three 
effects on mark-ups are much smaller in magnitude, albeit still very strong. This result is 
driven by consumption loans, which show a similar pattern. The results for commercial 
loans, on the other hand do differ. Our results suggest that the three channels increase their 
magnitude and become statistically significant when one considers financial conglomerates. 
This suggests that firms do shop more for good credit conditions, so that any exercise of 
market power in commercial loans requires more control of the market.  
 
For the subsequent analyses in this section we use the results of column (4) in Table 5.
12 
Our results state that the elasticity of the Lerner Index with respect to concentration 
depends on the level of risk. Figure 11 shows iso-Lerner curves, that is, different 
combinations of concentration and risk consistent with constant levels of market power. 
This is a phase space graph: each point corresponds to a possible state of the financial 
system. The measure of concentration (HHI, on the y-axis) is based on total loans. The risk 
measure, on the x-axis,  is the percentage of non-performing loans. The small squares at the 
right of the graph show the exercise of market power in the corresponding level curve. For 
instance, L=35% indicates the curve where the Lerner index is 0.35. Finally, the boxes with 
years mark the observed concentration – risk combination in the banking system in each 
December
13. 
                                                 
12 We choose to focus on total loans, not on assets because the former seem a better indicator on the firms’ 
activity.  
13 Curves are calculated based on the estimates of equation (2). Given that only risk and concentration vary, 




To read the graph, consider the effects on mark-ups of a given increase in risk –a horizontal 
movement to the right, like the onset of an economic downturn. At low levels of 
concentration, this movement will cause the system to cross few iso-Lerner curves: the 
exercise of market power does not increase much. At high levels of concentration, in 
contrast, the increase in mark-ups is larger. Alternatively, consider a vertical move upwards 
–an increase in market concentration at a given level of risk, like a merger. If current 
systemic risk is low, the merger won’t affect mark-ups by much. However, if risk is high, it 
will lead to larger increases in the Lerner index. 
 
In summary, Figure 11 suggests that in periods with high risk (as observed in late 1990s 
and early 2000s in Colombia), a merger would have stronger effects on the Lerner index. 
On the contrary, in boom periods, with low financial risk, a merger would have lower 
effects on market power.  
  
VII. Conclusions   
This paper relates market power with concentration and risk in the financial sector. Using 
Colombian data we identify three effects. First, a direct positive effect of concentration on 
the Lerner index, which may be a sign that higher concentration leads to the exercise of 
market power, or that mergers occur when for external reasons risk premiums are high. 
Since we are explicitly controlling for risk in the regression, either those mergers are 
undertaken to achieve medium-term cost reductions that we cannot account for with our  
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empirical specification, or they are undertaken to achieve extra market power, or maybe 
both.  
 
The second effect is that the Lerner index falls when risk increases, which is consistent with 
credit rationing in the market. The third effect is that an increase in concentration allows for 
a stronger transmission of risk to the Lerner index (i.e. to the customers). This last result 
suggests that systemic risk is an important element to include when examining the link 
between concentration and market power in the financial system: it seems to act as a 
“collusion” device for banks in recent Colombian history. When risk is high firms do 
transfer a larger share of risk to customers through higher risk premiums. Thus, while high 
concentration is not enough to have collusion, the true effects of high market concentration 
on interest rates’ mark-ups emerge when the system is under stress.  
 
Why would the banks be more able to transfer risk to customers when risk levels are high? 
A possible interpretation is that, in good times with strong business, banks compete for 
borrowers and collusion is hard to maintain. In a recession or a crisis, the increased 
vulnerability of the system leads banks to fear a run on them started by a bank going 
bankrupt. Therefore, a recession reduces the incentives to compete in the sector and acts 
instead as a coordinating signal for cooperation.  
 
When considering banks individually, all three estimated effects are very large –except for 
commercial loans, where they don’t seem important. If the banks that belong to a financial 
conglomerate are treated as a single institution, all three effects on mark-ups become 
smaller in magnitude but are still very strong. Moreover, a similar pattern of results appear  
 
24
for commercial loans. This suggests that any exercise of market power in commercial loans 
requires more control of the market.  
 
The discussion here is not really about the level of market power in itself, but about the 
circumstances under which banks do exercise their market power. The theory suggests that 
the ability to exercise market power increases with concentration. Whether firms do it or 
not remains an empirical issue. Our results suggest that in the past, under bad 
macroeconomic conditions, the Colombian banks have exercised such market power. 
 
Our results have at least two important implications for bank regulation. First, suppose a 
merger is proposed in the sector that needs the approval of a regulatory institution. Suppose 
moreover that systemic risk is low. An ex ante assessment of the effect of the merger is 
then likely to understate its effects on consumers if it does not consider the hypothetical 
scenario of an increase in systemic risk. A merger that looks convenient in boom times 
might be, from a social point of view, counterproductive in periods of crisis. This makes the 
requirements for approval more stringent.  
 
A second implication is more favorable to mergers: if banks argue convincingly that 
systemic risk will fall with a merger, even a significant increase in concentration might lead 
to negligible increases in market power.  
We use for our analysis non-performing loans –a standard risk measure. However, the exact 
risk measure adequate for a specific analysis may vary. The analysis may call for instance 
for an industry or country-level measure instead of a firm-level one. This paper proposes a  
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type of analysis rather than a specific way to carry it out, and shows how this analysis was 
relevant for the Colombian banking sector in recent years. Further research should explore 
the role of risk as a collusion signal in other contexts and using different risk –and 
concentration– measures.  
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Table 1  Economies of scale in commercial banks 
Paper   Time  Period  Output  EE  EEA 
Bernal y Herrera, 1983  1981     .93   
Suescún, 1987  1983 y 1986  Credit and debit accounts  .71  .83 
Ferrufino, 1991  1986 – 1988  No. credit accounts  




Suescún y Misas, 1996  1989 – 1995  Credit portfolio  .78  1.06 





Source: Janna, 2004. EE stands for Economies of Scale, defined as the percentage increase in costs associated 
with a 1% increase in the output measure. EEA stands for Extended Economies of Scale, which takes into 
account new branches. 
 
Table 2 Economic Efficiency in Colombia Banks 
Paper Time  Period  Methodology 
a  Average 
Efficiency 
Suescún y Misas, 1996  1989 – 1995  Gross frontier   73% 
Castro, 2001  1994 – 1999  Distribution free approach  49% 
Badel, 2002
b  1998 – 2000  Distribution free approach  73% 




Estrada y Osorio, 2004  1989 – 2003  Stochastic frontier  28% 
Estrada, 2005  1994 – 2004  Stochastic frontier  71% 
Source: Janna (2004) y Estrada (2005).  
a For a full description of the methodology, see Janna (2003). 
b The estimated cost frontier includes banks 
from Costa Rica, Colombia y México. The figure reported is the average of Colombian banks.  
 
Table 3 Economic efficiency determinants in the Colombian banking system 
  PAPER 
Variables  Castro, 2001  Badel, 2002  Janna, 2003 
Foreign  Not Significant     Positive  Ownership 
  Public Negative    Not  Significant 
Size and ROE    Positive   
Branches   Negative     
ROA Positive  Negative  Positiva 
Bank Characteristics 
Solvency Positive    
Portfolio deterioration  Negative  Negative   
Portfolio quality      Negative 
Type of producto 
% commercial portfolio  Positive    Positive 
Regulation     Negative 
Economic cycle      Negative 
Market conditions 
Concentration     Negative 






Lerner Index Determinants 
(By institution) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEP. VAR: Lerner 
Index  Total loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans




HHI by:  Total assets  Total assets  Total loans
+ Total  loans




Risk in:  Total loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans




                   
ln(HHI) -0.75  0.75  -0.222  1.701  1.705  0.065 
 [0.094]***  [0.424]*  [0.090]**  [0.425]***  [0.489]***  [0.343] 
ln(Risk)  0.007 -2.574 -0.013 -3.928 -3.769 -0.847 
  [0.022] [0.719]*** [0.024] [0.811]***  [1.194]*** [0.531] 
ln(HHI)*ln(Risk)     0.407     0.6  0.571  0.127 
     [0.113]***    [0.124]***  [0.183]***  [0.081] 
ln(IPI)  0.171 0.299 0.151 0.267 0.125 0.146 
  [0.097]* [0.093]*** [0.103] [0.091]*** [0.077]  [0.139] 
Trend  0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
Q2  0.031 0.026 0.029 0.026 -0.008 0.043 
  [0.010]*** [0.010]** [0.010]*** [0.010]**  [0.005]  [0.014]*** 
Q3  0.001 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009 -0.025  0.014 
  [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013]  [0.008]***  [0.015] 
Q4  -0.044 -0.055 -0.049 -0.056 -0.039 -0.033 
  [0.018]** [0.017]*** [0.019]** [0.018]*** [0.009]***  [0.021] 
Constant 1.977  -8.103  -1.09  -14.245  -12.202  -2.219 
  [0.602]***  [2.785]*** [0.711] [2.840]***  [3.130]*** [2.379] 
                    
R2  0.517 0.527 0.501 0.524 0.561 0.421 
Number  of  observations  2837 2837 2837 2837 2674 2789 
                   
Standard errors in brackets             
* Significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level         
+Only includes commercial and consumption loans       





























Lerner Index Determinants 
(By financial conglomerate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEP. VAR: Lerner 
Index  Total loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans




HHI by:  Total assets  Total assets  Total loans
+ Total  loans




Risk in:  Total loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans
+ Total  loans




                   
ln(HHI) 0.343  1.105  -0.09  0.913  0.98  0.356 
  [0.139]**  [0.280]*** [0.154] [0.312]***  [0.256]*** [0.263] 
ln(Risk)  0.106 -1.955 0.113 -2.481 -2.502 -1.225 
  [0.031]*** [0.594]*** [0.031]*** [0.641]*** [0.740]*** [0.373]*** 
ln(HHI)*ln(Risk)     0.289    0.365  0.358  0.178 
     [0.081]***    [0.088]***  [0.106]***  [0.053]*** 
ln(IPI) 0.59  0.531  0.295  0.281  0.025  0.116 
 [0.160]***  [0.160]***  [0.157]*  [0.145]*  [0.077]  [0.200] 
Trend  0.003 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.006 
  [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
Q2  0.004 0.011 0.018 0.024 -0.009 0.047 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.006]  [0.019]** 
Q3  -0.054 -0.044 -0.026 -0.019  -0.02  0.001 
 [0.016]***  [0.016]**  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.008]**  [0.021] 
Q4  -0.109 -0.101 -0.077 -0.071 -0.037 -0.051 
  [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.026]*** [0.025]*** [0.011]***  [0.029]* 
Constant -5.557  -10.772  -1.271  -8.391  -7.438  -3.909 
  [1.071]***  [1.884]*** [1.223] [2.176]***  [1.755]*** [2.098]* 
                    
R2  0.305 0.323 0.301 0.325 0.423 0.199 
Number  of  observations  2203 2203 2203 2203 2041 2184 
                   
Standard errors in brackets             
* Significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level         
+Only includes commercial and consumption loans           
Source: Superfinanciera.Own calculations 
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Iso-Lerner curves in risk-concentration space 
 
  Each change of shade marks an iso-Lerner level curve. The value of the 
Lerner index on each level curve appears on the right of the graph. The 
boxes with year values indicate the position of the Colombian financial 
system each December from 1996 through 2006. There are two clear 
stages: the crisis (1996-1999) and recovery (2000-2006).  
 
 
 
 
 